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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Amanda Diaz contends that the State elicited improper testimony from two different
officers during her trial, and that each instance amounts to prosecutorial misconduct and
fundamental error. The State responds, asserting that each of Ms. Diaz’s claims fail because they
do not violate unwaived constitutional rights, and are not prejudicial, per the analysis set forth in
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). The State’s arguments are mistaken.
First, the elicited testimony improperly comments on Ms. Diaz’s refusal to consent to a
blood draw (i.e., her refusal to waive the Fourth Amendment’s protections with respect to a
blood draw), and offers an improper opinion on the ultimate question of fact. Since both are
improper points to make to a jury, eliciting each point amounts to prosecutorial misconduct, and
that misconduct violates Ms. Diaz’s constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process. Second,
the State’s evidence is not near as strong as the State seems to believe, and as a result, there is the
reasonable possibility that each of these instances of misconduct affected the verdict by
contributing to the jurors’ decision to put aside otherwise-reasonable doubts and convict
Ms. Diaz of driving under the influence of drugs or other intoxicating substances.
As such, both instances of improper testimony are prejudicial, and thus, are reversible
fundamental errors. Therefore, this Court should vacate the verdict and judgment and remand
this case for further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Ms. Diaz’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Whether Officer Moe and Officer Carter offered improper testimony which constitutes
prosecutorial misconduct.
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ARGUMENT
Officer Moe And Officer Carter Offered Improper Testimony Which Constitutes Prosecutorial
Misconduct

A.

Officer Moe’s Impermissible Comment On Ms. Diaz’s Exercise Of Her Fourth
Amendment Right To Refuse To Consent To A Blood Draw Constituted Prosecutorial
Misconduct
The State contends that Ms. Diaz cannot show Officer Moe’s testimony violates an

unwaived constitutional right because she consented to a different type of search, which, in the
State’s view, means Ms. Diaz waived all her Fourth Amendment rights. (Resp. Br., pp.6-7.)
That argument is wrong for several reasons.
First, consensual waiver of the Fourth Amendment rights is not an all-or-nothing
proposition. Rather, the person may limit the scope of their consent (in other words, the scope of
their waiver of their waiver of the Fourth Amendment’s protections), and “the State must
conform its search to the limitations placed upon the right granted by the consent.”
State v. Tyler, 153 Idaho 623, 627 (Ct. App. 2012). The scope of consent is measured by what a
reasonable person would understand from the exchange between the suspect and the officer.
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991); Tyler, 153 Idaho at 627. If the officers act beyond
the scope of the person’s consent, they violate that person’s still-unwaived Fourth Amendment
rights. See, e.g., Tyler, 153 Idaho at 627-28.
Based on the evidence in this case, a reasonable person would understand the scope of
Ms. Diaz’s consent to be limited to just providing a urine sample,1 and that she specifically did
not waive her Fourth Amendment rights in regard to a blood draw. As Officer Moe testified,

1

In fact, the district court found Ms. Diaz’s consent to providing that sample to be particularly
narrow, in that it did not even extend to allow a forceful extraction of the urine sample.
(R., p.57.)
3

“There was a discussion of whether she would submit to a blood draw having Meridian Fire and
Paramedics come take a blood sample from her. She did not consent to that, but did agree to
provide a sample at the jail.” (Tr., p.201, Ls.14-17 (emphasis added); see also R., p.55 (the
district court finding in regard to a motion to suppress that Ms. Diaz agreed to provide a urine
sample at the jail).) Since she specifically refused to consent to a blood draw, the blood draw
was not within the scope of her consent, and thus, she did not waive the Fourth Amendment’s
protections vis-à-vis the blood draw. As a result, the comment on Ms. Diaz’s refusal to consent
to a blood draw is a violation of her still-unwaived Fourth Amendment rights despite the fact that
she gave limited consent to provide a urine sample. See State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463,
470-71 (2007) (holding that commenting on a refusal to consent to a search is a violation of the
Fourth Amendment).
Second, the State’s argument on the first prong of the Perry analysis is unpersuasive
because it ignores the fact that Ms. Diaz is actually raising a claim of prosecutorial misconduct –
that eliciting that improper comment was, itself, error. (See App. Br., p.7.) Prosecutorial
misconduct, which includes eliciting (intentionally or otherwise) improper testimony, would
violate the defendant’s constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process.

See, e.g.,

State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 61 (2011). Therefore, it is more than just Ms. Diaz’s Fourth
Amendment rights which are violated by Officer Moe’s improper testimony; her Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights are violated as well. For all those reasons, the first prong of the
Perry analysis is satisfied in this regard – the error infringes on at least one of Ms. Diaz’s
unwaived constitutional rights.
The State also contends that Ms. Diaz has failed to meet the third prong of the Perry
analysis because she was just making a choice between two options, and so, “[t]here was no
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implication, no inference that could be drawn” in regard to her guilt from her refusal to consent
to the blood test.

(Resp. Br., pp.7-8.)

The State’s argument is belied by Officer Moe’s

testimony. Specifically, Officer Moe testified he could not effectively collect a urine sample at
the police station, and so, asked Ms. Diaz if she would consent to a blood draw instead.
(Tr., p.200, L.16 - p.201, L.17.) After Ms. Diaz refused to consent to that search, she agreed to
provide a urine sample at the jail. (Tr., p.201, Ls.17-22; R., p.55.) Thus, Ms. Diaz was not, as
the State believes, simply presented with two options and asked to select one; rather, the two
requests, though related, were chronologically distinct, and thus, independent, events. Therefore,
there was an inference to be drawn from her independent refusal to consent to a blood test.
Regardless, the fact that Ms. Diaz agreed to provide the urine sample means there was no
relevant reason to mention the blood test alternative at all. Cf. State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569,
___, 388 P.3d 583, 587-88 (2017) (disapproving of admitting otherwise-inadmissible evidence
just to complete the story or give context to the evidence). She had agreed to a viable method
(which was, in fact, the preferred method)2 by which the State could get the information it
sought. Therefore, the only reason to mention her refusal to consent to the blood test was to get
the jury thinking that Ms. Diaz was trying to hide something (i.e., to infer her guilt). Compare
Christiansen, 144 Idaho at 470 (finding fundamental error in a similar situation). Therefore,
given the reasonable possibility that this particular line of questioning would illicit an improper
comment on Ms. Diaz’s decision to not consent to the blood draw, from which the jurors might
infer Ms. Diaz’s guilt, that misconduct was prejudicial under Perry. Compare Ellington, 151
Idaho at 61.

2

Officer Moe testified that, “[w]ithin the City of Meridian, more often than not, try to collect a
urine sample” when conducting a DRE. (Tr., p.200, Ls.16-24.)
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The State also contends that the comment about Ms. Diaz’s refusal to consent to the
blood draw would not have affected the verdict in this case because of the perceived strength of
the other evidence it presented. (Resp. Br., p.8.) However, the State’s case is not nearly as
strong as it believes. The critical fact to remember is that the question was whether Ms. Diaz’s
ability to drive was actually impaired by drugs or intoxicating substances. (See R., pp.23-24.)
The record reveals there are several points on which a juror may have had a reasonable doubt
about the answer to that question.
For example, Ms. Diaz’s performance on most of the physiological tests conducted
during the DRE was within normal limits. (See generally Tr., pp.257-269.) As such, that
evidence indicates her physical behavior was not actually being impaired by drugs or
intoxicating substances.

Furthermore, Ms. Diaz’s poor performance on several of the

psychophysical tests was not particularly telling in regard to whether Ms. Diaz’s actions were
influenced by drugs or intoxicating substances because, as Officer Carter admitted, that
performance could have been attributable to her underlying medical conditions. (See Tr., p.285,
L.16 - p.286, L.4, p.287, Ls.5-25.) Similarly, the hospital test results which indicated Ms. Diaz
had drugs or intoxicating substances in her system were only “preliminary” and “presumptive,”
and so, the jurors could have harbored reasonable doubt about whether those results showed
actual impairment, as opposed to the presence of trace amounts from hours or days prior.
(See Exhibits, p.12; Tr., p.338, L.21 - p.339, L.1.)
The State glosses over all these weaknesses in arguing about the illusory strength of its
case. (See Resp. Br., p.8.) In doing so, its argument runs contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court
precedent on point, which explains that, when these sort of weaknesses exist in the State’s case,
there is a reasonable possibility that the inference of guilt from improper comments about the
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defendant’s refusal to consent to a search would affect the jurors’ decision to overlook those
reasonable doubts and convict her anyway. See Christiansen, 144 Idaho at 470-71 (explaining
that, only because such weaknesses did not exist in that case, the improper comment was not
prejudicial, but “[i]f the evidence of Christiansen’s guilt were less cut, we would vacate the
judgment because of the prosecuting attorney’s misconduct”).

Thus, because of those

weaknesses in the State’s case, there is a reasonable possibility that the prosecutor’s misconduct
in eliciting Officer Moe’s improper comment on Ms. Diaz’s refusal to consent to a blood draw
affected the outcome in this case.
As a result, the prosecutorial misconduct of eliciting Officer Moe’s improper testimony
constitutes reversible fundamental error.

B.

Officer Carter’s Impermissible Opinion Testimony, Which Invaded The Province Of The
Jury By Speaking To The Ultimate Issue In The Case, Constituted Prosecutorial
Misconduct
The State’s first argument in response to Ms. Diaz’s claim about improperly eliciting

Officer Carter’s opinion is that she cannot raise that challenge as fundamental error because the
underlying statement – Officer Carter’s improper opinion – would have violated only a rule of
evidence, not a constitutional right. (Resp. Br., pp.9-10.) However, as with the argument about
Officer Moe’s impermissible testimony, the State ignores the fact that Ms. Diaz has actually
raised a claim of prosecutorial misconduct – that eliciting that improper testimony was, itself,
erroneous. (See App. Br., pp.11-15.) The Idaho Supreme Court has indicated this precise claim
(eliciting improper opinion testimony from an officer) can be raised as prosecutorial misconduct
on appeal:
Not only was his [the officer’s] answer an inadmissible intrusion into the jury’s
domain . . ., it was also completely unsolicited and wholly unnecessary. As an
officer of the State, [the officer’s] gratuitous and prejudicial response is imputed
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to the State, whether or not the State intended to elicit that response. Had
Mr. Ellington raised this issue as another instance of prosecutorial misconduct on
appeal, we would have found, once again, that the State’s conduct was improper.
Ellington, 151 Idaho at 67.3 Prosecutorial misconduct violates the defendant’s constitutional
rights to a fair trial and due process. See, e.g., Christiansen, 144 Idaho at 469. As such, even
though the admission of Officer Carter’s underlying opinion testimony may also violate the rules
of evidence (which actually shows why it is improper testimony), analyzing the claim Ms. Diaz
has raised in this appeal, rather than addressing the strawman the State has erected in its place,
the error (prosecutorial misconduct) would violate at least one of Ms. Diaz’s unwaived
constitutional rights. Therefore, this argument satisfies the first prong of Perry.
As to the third prong of Perry, the State continues to contend that Ms. Diaz has not
shown prejudice based on its erroneous belief in the strength of its case. (Resp. Br., pp.10-11.)
However, as discussed in Section I, supra, the State’s case is not nearly as strong as it believes.
Furthermore, the State’s argument ignores the more insidious problem which arises when the
prosecutor elicits improper opinion testimony – that the jurors will defer to that improper opinion
when weighing evidence. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 852, 857 (Ct. App. 1991). This
is particularly true when the improper opinion testimony speaks to the precise point on which the
jurors may be harboring reasonable doubts. (See App. Br., p.14 n.7 (identifying numerous other
courts which have recognized this problem with such improper testimony).) Therefore, the risk
that the jurors would defer to Officer Carter’s improper opinion, rather than conduct their own
evaluation of the evidence, demonstrates that, regardless of the perceived strength of the State’s

3

In Ellington, the admissibility of the underlying opinion testimony had been challenged by trial
counsel. See Ellington, 151 Idaho at 66. However, there is no indication that Mr. Ellington’s
trial counsel also made a prosecutorial misconduct argument. See generally id. Therefore, it
appears the Idaho Supreme Court was also acknowledging that this sort of prosecutorial
misconduct issue could be raised as fundamental error. See id.
8

case, there is still a reasonable possibility that the prosecutorial misconduct in eliciting that
improper opinion “affected the outcome at trial” by causing the jurors to not even evaluate the
evidence, and defer to the improper opinion instead. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226 (summarizing the
proper analysis on the third prong).
As noted supra, there are plenty of areas in which the jurors may have harbored
reasonable doubt, such as the fact that Ms. Diaz was within normal limits on most of the
physiological tests conducted during the DRE. (See generally Tr., pp.257-269.) And, notably, it
was Officer Carter himself who admitted that Ms. Diaz’s poor performance on several of the
psychophysical tests could be attributable to her medical conditions rather than to the influence
of drugs or intoxicating substances. (Tr., p.285, L.16 - p.286, L.4, p.287, Ls.5-25.) With those
weaknesses in the State’s case, the impact of Officer Carter’s improper opinion testimony is
more pronounced – he is effectively asking the jurors to disregard the reasonable doubts they,
like he, have about what Ms. Diaz’s performance on the individual parts of the DRE shows in
regard to whether Ms. Diaz was actually impaired, and adopt his opinion that the tests showed
she was impaired at the time she was driving the car instead. (See Tr., p.276, Ls.21-22.)
In fact, in offering that particular opinion – that Ms. Diaz was “impaired while she was
driving that vehicle” (Tr., p.276, Ls.21-22 (emphasis added) – Officer Carter’s testimony went
beyond what even a potentially-proper opinion could express because his opinion went to the
ultimate question of fact.

See State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 696 (1988) (holding it is

impermissible for a witness to opine about the ultimate conclusion the jury is being asked to
consider); compare State v. Corwin, 147 Idaho 893, 896-97 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding there was
no error where the DRE investigator only testified that the DRE showed the defendant was
impaired because that witness did not go further and testify that the defendant was impaired
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while he was driving). Therefore, the fact that Officer Carter’s opinion was not an opinion about
some side question, but rather, was an opinion about the central question which the jurors were
being asked to evaluate, reinforces the conclusion that there is a reasonable possibility his
improper testimony affected the outcome of the trial, and thus, was prejudicial.
As a result, the prosecutorial misconduct of eliciting Officer Carter’s improper opinion
testimony constitutes reversible fundamental error.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Diaz respectfully requests this Court vacate the verdict and judgment of conviction in
this case and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 20th day of June, 2017.
_________/s/________________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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